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Ever since the Supreme Court issued its short-lived and politically
1
obtuse opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the
issue of equal pay has risen to the forefront of the national conversation
about gender equality. The Court’s decision ruled as time-barred Title VII
claims challenging pay discrimination that originated outside of the
statute’s very short charge-filing period—even when the pay
discrimination is ongoing and continues to produce discriminatory
2
paychecks that the employee receives within the time limit for suing.
The ruling prompted a strong public outcry, bolstered by one of Justice
Ginsburg’s most impassioned and galvanizing dissents. Of the many
scathing editorials excoriating the Court’s opinion, my favorite was from
the New York Times, which summed up the ruling succinctly with the
3
title, “Injustice 5, Justice 4.”
*
Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. I am grateful to Valerie Howell for her excellent research assistance in support
of this article.
1. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
2. Id. at 623–32.
3. Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/opinion/31thu1.html?_r=0. Other newspaper editorial
boards joined in the fun. See, e.g., Editorial, Supreme Letdown; The High Court Finds a Way
to Accept Discrimination, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 6, 2007, http://www.postgazette.com/opinion/editorials/2007/06/05/Supreme-letdown-The-high-court-finds-a-way-toaccept-discrimination/stories/200706050212; see also Clarence Page, Editorial, Supreme
Injustice
on
Worker
Equality,
THE
BALTIMORE
SUN,
June
5,
2007,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-06-05/news/0706050128_1_justice-supreme-court-onlywoman.
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Congress responded with unusual speed, in time to present newlyelected President Obama with the opportunity to sign into law the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (LLFPA) as the first new legislative enactment of
his Administration. The Act essentially codified the approach advocated
in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, overriding the majority ruling and
correcting the time problem created by the Ledbetter Court. Under the
LLFPA, each new paycheck that pays an employee less because of sex
resets the clock for the limitations period for asserting the employee’s
4
Title VII rights. The Act cured the immediate problem arising from the
Ledbetter decision that ongoing pay discrimination beginning outside the
limitations period was immunized from challenge, effectively
grandfathered-in by the Court’s ruling, even if the employee did not
realize she was being paid less until much later.
The LLFPA was a needed corrective to the rights-claiming problem
created by the Court. However, it did not affect the substantive law
regulating pay inequality or do anything to alleviate the legal hurdles to
succeeding on pay discrimination claims on their merits. The political
movement for pay equality that was behind the Act has a much broader
scope, however. With the sympathetic figure of the hardworking
grandmother, Lilly Ledbetter, as the poster-child for the movement, equal
pay has become a resurgent rallying cry for workers and politicians alike.
Since the Ledbetter decision, there is a new energy and political resonance
surrounding the gender wage gap and an urgency to fix it that has not
been matched since the 1970’s women’s movement pressed the demand of
equal pay for equal work.
At the level of public policy, the movement to close the gender wage
gap has coalesced around the Paycheck Fairness Act as a key piece of the
equal pay law reform strategy. The proposed Paycheck Fairness Act was
introduced in Congress on the heels of the legislative success with the
LLFPA as a needed reform to address the substantive shortcomings of
the equal pay laws. It has been repeatedly introduced, in slightly varying
iterations, in each legislative session, but has failed to gain enough
5
support to pass both houses of Congress.
The bill contains a multi-pronged approach to the problem, including
measures to produce greater transparency in wages and enhanced
protection from retaliation against employees for discussing or inquiring
6
about employee pay. As for strengthening the substantive rights against
pay discrimination, the cornerstone of the bill is a provision that would
tighten up the primary defense in the Equal Pay Act, the “factor other
4. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)(A).
5. See Irin Carmon, Republicans Block Paycheck Fairness Act Once Again,
MSNBC.COM (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/republicans-block-paycheckfairness-act-again.
6. See Denise A. Cardman, The Paycheck Fairness Act: Major Provisions, AM. BAR
ASS’N.
(June
2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2015jun11_pfaprovisions.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
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than sex” (FOTS) defense, which immunizes a pay disparity from
challenge. Depending on how broadly the defense is construed, it has the
potential to derail equal pay claims by allowing any facially neutral factor
to justify paying women less than men for performing equal work. The
proposed bill would rein in the defense by requiring the factor to be bona
7
fide, job-related and consistent with business necessity. The language
borrows from the defense to Title VII disparate impact claims in an effort
to require closer judicial scrutiny of the business reasons underlying
facially neutrally reasons for paying workers of one sex less for doing
substantially equal work.
The proposed change to the FOTS defense is the most controversial
part of the bill. Critics charge that it would intrude too deeply into
employer discretion and take issue with proponents’ assertion that
discrimination, as opposed to individual choice and market
8
forces,explains the gender wage gap. More legally-oriented critics charge
that the move would turn the disparate treatment claim into a disparate
9
impact claim, without justification for doing so. Even supporters of
closing the gender wage gap are less than enthusiastic about making the
10
FOTS defense the centerpiece of the reform strategy. They point out
that most pay discrimination cases falter before even getting to the
defense because of the strict approach courts take to determining whether
11
employees are performing substantially equal work. Unless courts
moderate their approach to that threshold issue, reforming the factor
other than sex defense will not make a difference in the success of equal
pay claims in the courts.
This essay considers the proposed changes to the FOTS defense in
light of lessons gleaned from the Supreme Court’s innovative move in an
employment discrimination case decided last year under the Pregnancy
7. See
Paycheck
Fairness
Act,
S.
862,
114th
Cong.
(2015),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s862.
8. See David S. Joachim, Senate Republicans Block Bill on Equal Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/politics/senate-republicans-block-bill-onequal-pay.html.
9. See, e.g., Gary Siniscalco et al., The Pay Gap, the Glass Ceiling, and Pay Bias:
Moving Forward 50 Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 395, 419 (2014)
(characterizing the PFA as adopting a disparate impact model for equal pay claims); and see
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Choices, Bias, and the Value of the Paycheck Fairness Act: A Response
Essay, 29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 429 (2014) (criticizing the PFA’s allowance of unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages).
10. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market
Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 206–08 (2011) [hereinafter
Porter & Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth] (contending that the PFA will not provide a
remedy for unequal pay for most women, including and especially professional women, because
of the tightness of the comparators required to prove a violation, but nevertheless expressing
tepid support for the PFA on the ground that a partial solution is better than none).
11. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass
Ceiling, 63 S.M.U. L. REV. 17 (2010) (surveying the lower courts’ case law and the
demonstrating the strictness of the substantially similar work requirement in Equal Pay Act
claims).
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Discrimination Act, Young v. United Parcel Services, Inc.
The
framework adopted in that case can help pave the way for the tightening
of the FOTS defense, while still keeping the claim grounded as a disparate
treatment claim. Part I examines the application of the FOTS defense in
the courts. While some courts have been moving to apply a heightened
judicial scrutiny of the employer’s reasons for a pay disparity, others
follow an anything-goes approach. Without careful scrutiny of the
employer’s facially neutral reasons for paying women less, the pay
discrimination claim segues into a search for the employer’s conscious
intent to pay an employee less because of her sex, rendering the claim all
but useless for remedying the gender wage gap. Part II explores the
framework embraced in Young, in which unjustified impact supports an
inference of intentional discrimination. It argues that the Equal Pay Act
should take a page from the decision in Young and similarly move to
scrutinizing employer justifications for the different treatment of
comparators. Using insights from the Young decision, it responds to
criticisms that tightening of FOTS defense would turn the equal pay
claim into a disparate impact claim. Finally, Part III argues that the
proposed framework for the FOTS defense is better designed to reach the
kind of implicit bias that is at the heart of pay discrimination in the
modern workforce. As important as preventing equal pay litigation from
being derailed by an unconstrained FOTS defense is the contribution the
proposed framework could make to the political dialogue about the roots
of pay inequality and the justifications for employer practices that
perpetuate it. By challenging the justifications for facially neutral
reasons for paying women less, the change proposed to the FOTS in the
Paycheck Fairness Act would make space for contesting the ideologies at
the heart of the debate over the gender wage gap.
I. THE FOTS DEFENSE IN THE COURTS: THE CONTROVERSY
OVER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE LEGITIMACY OF SEXNEUTRAL REASONS
Enacted one year before Title VII, the Equal Pay Act of 1963
prohibits an employer from paying an employee less than it pays an
employee of the other sex to perform substantially similar work, unless
the employer can justify the disparity under one of the four statutory
13
defenses. Of these, by far the most important is the factor other than
sex defense, which permits “a differential based on any factor other than
14
sex.” Left unconstrained, the FOTS defense would immunize a pay
12.
13.

Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:
PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 49 (1994) (tracing the origins
of the Equal Pay Act to a 1945 decision by the National Labor Board that the pay practices of
certain military contractors discriminated against women; although the War Board was
subsequently dismantled, its ruling prompted unions and women’s groups to agitate for
greater protection from pay discrimination).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(4) (2012).
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disparity whenever any facially neutral reason, however insubstantial or
irrational, could explain the gap in pay. An early amendment to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, known as the Bennett Amendment,
incorporated the defenses codified in the Equal Pay Act as defenses to
15
Title VII as well. Accordingly, while Title VII reaches sex-based
discrimination in compensation, the Equal Pay Act’s FOTS defense is also
a defense to a Title VII claim for sex-based pay discrimination. So the
scope of the FOTS defense matters for both Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act.
Early Supreme Court case law seemed to require more than a merely
gender neutral factor to assert the FOTS defense, suggesting that
employers must at least demonstrate a legitimate reason. In Corning
16
Glass Works v. Brennan, which is, remarkably, still the only Supreme
Court case decided squarely under the Equal Pay Act, the Court held that
work performed on the day and night shifts involved similar working
conditions since they occurred in the same surroundings and involved the
same hazards. As a result, proof that the company paid male night shift
workers a higher base wage (in addition to the premium paid to all
workers on the night shift) than female workers doing the same job on
17
the day shift established a prima facie violation of the Act. Because the
history at the plant showed that the men demanded a higher base wage
to induce them to do what they regarded as “women’s work,” inspection
jobs, at a time when women were prohibited by law from performing night
work, and because the higher base wage remained even after the company
added a pay differential to compensate all employees working the night
shift, the employer failed to prove that the pay differential resulted from
18
a factor other than sex. In the course of discussing the defense, the
Court cited legislative history describing differences in work conditions
19
as a “legitimate” reason for a pay differential. The quoted text implies
that factors other than sex must at least be legitimate for purposes of the
defense.
Four years later, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
20
v. Manhart, the Court again discussed the FOTS defense. The case
involved a Title VII challenge to the company’s practice of charging
female employees higher pension premiums on the ground that women as
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(h) (2012) (“It shall not be an unlawful employment practice
under [Title VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act].”); Cnty. of Wash. v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168–69 (1981) (interpreting the Bennett Amendment to incorporate
into Title VII sex-based pay discrimination claims the affirmative defenses codified in the
EPA).
16. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
17. Id. at 203–05.
18. Id. at 191–92 n.3.
19. Id. at 201.
20. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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a group live longer than men. The Court found the premium differential
violated Title VII. Responding to the employer’s argument that the
Bennett Amendment to Title VII excused any differential that satisfied
the Equal Pay Act’s FOTS defense, the Court explained that the factor
other than sex could not itself be based on sex, so that the employer’s use
22
of sex as a proxy for longevity did not satisfy the defense. Not every
factor that is related to business qualifies as a factor other than sex, for
23
purposes of the defense, the Court continued. Again, the Court’s
language suggests that a factor other than sex must relate to the
employer’s business.
Finally, in another Title VII case decided a few years later, County
24
of Washington v. Gunther, the Court affirmed a lower court decision
finding that the county’s practice of paying women prison guards at a
women’s prison significantly less than male guards at a men’s prison
25
violated Title VII. The jobs guarding male prisoners substantially
differed from the jobs guarding female prisoners, so the employer argued
that because the practice did not violate the Equal Pay Act, which only
applies to similar jobs, the Bennett Amendment meant that it did not
26
violate Title VII either. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
Title VII has a potentially broader scope than the EPA, since the EPA
requires substantially similar jobs while Title VII is violated by paying
27
an employee less because of his or her sex. In the case at hand, even
though the jobs were dissimilar, the county’s failure to pay women guards
at the level recommended by the county’s own pay study served as
evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent to pay the women less
because of their sex. In dicta, describing the FOTS defense in the course
of explaining how the Bennett Amendment interacts with Title VII, the
Court stated that the FOTS exception was enacted by Congress as a
response to the “legitimate needs of businesses” and is limited to “bona
28
fide job evaluation systems.” This language too suggests some businessrelatedness constraint on the FOTS defense.
These early cases suggest, albeit in dicta, that courts should not
simply defer to employer assertions of a sex-neutral factor, but should
scrutinize them to ensure that they are at least legitimate and business
related. However, a more recent pronouncement in Supreme Court case
law suggests a more lax approach. In a case decided under the Age
29
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Smith v. Jackson, the
Court held that disparate impact is actionable under the ADEA. In a part
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 712.
Id.
452 U.S. 161 (1981).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170–71.
544 U.S. 228 (2005).
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of the opinion joined by only four Justices, the plurality discussed a
provision in the ADEA known as the RFOA (“reasonable factor other than
30
age”) as an additional source of support for the ruling. The plurality
contrasted the language in the EPA’s FOTS defense with the language in
the RFOA, which permits an employment practice that is “otherwise
prohibited” under the ADEA if it was based on “reasonable factors other
31
than age” (RFOA). In contrast, the plurality noted, in the FOTS defense,
“Congress barred recovery if a pay differential was based ‘on any other
32
factor’—reasonable or unreasonable—other than sex.” This language
assumes that the only criteria for the sex-neutral factor is that it not be
based on sex.
This shift in the Court’s tone toward the FOTS defense is in keeping
with the Court’s move away from legitimacy as a constraint on the
employer’s nondiscriminatory reason in the individual disparate
treatment framework. In the Court’s first articulation of the burdenshifting model for individual disparate treatment claims in McDonnell
33
Douglas Corp. v. Green, it described the burden on the employer as
requiring a “legitimate” nondiscriminatory reason. Pointing out the
strength of McDonnell Douglas’s reason for not rehiring the plaintiff, who
had engaged in an illegal and disruptive demonstration against it, the
Court implied that weaker employer justifications might not be
34
“reasonable” or “legitimate” enough to meet the employer’s burden. In
its more recent case law, however, the Court abandoned any legitimacy
constraint on the nondiscriminatory reason asserted by the employer. The
35
clearest indication of this retreat is Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins,
an age discrimination claim, in which the Court held that firing an
employee in order to prevent him from vesting in the company’s pension
benefits qualified as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason despite its
illegality under ERISA and despite the adverse impact such a rule had on
36
older employees. As long as the reason is nondiscriminatory—meaning
only that it is “analytically distinct” from the protected class—it suffices
37
to rebut the inference of discrimination. While the Biggins holding does
30. Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012).
32. 544 U.S. at 239 n.11 (plurality opinion).
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. 411 U.S. at 802–03 (“We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every
matter which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire.”); id. at 803
n.17 (“[w]e need not consider or decide here whether, or under what circumstances, unlawful
activity not directed against the particular employer may be a legitimate justification for
refusal to rehire”); id. at 806 n.21 (“. . . in this case, given the seriousness and harmful potential
of respondent’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ and the accompanying inconvenience to other
employees, it cannot be said that the petitioner’s refusal . . . lacked a rational and neutral
business justification.”); id. at 804 (citing the employer’s “reaction, if any, to [the plaintiff’s]
legitimate civil rights activities” as evidence relevant to showing pretext).
35. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 611.
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not govern the EPA’s FOTS defense—it involves a different statute and
the scope of the employer’s burden to rebut the inference from the prima
facie caserather than an affirmative defense—its approach is consistent
with the plurality’s description of the FOTS defense in Smith.
Meanwhile, lacking authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court
on the scope of the FOTS defense, lower courts have taken a wide range
of approaches on the strength of the sex-neutral reason required to
establish the defense. At the most deferential end of the spectrum, some
courts perceive absolutely no constraint on the sex-neutral factor that will
support the defense and refuse to scrutinize the reasonableness of the
38
employer’s reason. Other courts require the sex-neutral factor to at least
be “legitimate,” but apply this standard in such a way as to approve the
asserted reason with little scrutiny of its relationship to the employer’s
39
business needs. Other courts go well beyond this, however, and have
ramped up their scrutiny of the business justifications behind the sex40
neutral factor. These courts apply a level of scrutiny that is effectively
indistinguishable from that proposed by the Paycheck Fairness Act, that
the employer demonstrate a “bona fide” factor other than sex that is “jobrelated with respect to the position in question” and “consistent with
41
business necessity.”
The “anything goes” courts permit any sex-neutral factor, reasonable
or not, to justify a pay disparity, with no scrutiny of the business
justification for relying on it. Cases in the Fourth, Seventh and Eighth
Circuits adopt this approach. For example, the Fourth Circuit has broadly
construed the FOTS defense, requiring only that the employer’s reason
be sex-neutral; under this standard, the employer’s process of considering
the higher-paid male employee’s resume and prior salary, and negotiating
with him, met the requirement of a sex-neutral reason for paying him
42
more than the plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit put it more bluntly,
explaining that all the statute asks is whether the employer’s reason was
43
or was not based on sex, “not whether it is a ‘good’ reason.” Accordingly,
the court permitted paying a woman less for performing the same work
where the employer had set pay for lateral hires based on prior salary,
without inquiring into whether the employer had an “acceptable business
38. See discussion infra notes 43–47.
39. See discussion infra notes 49–56.
40. See discussion infra notes 57–70.
41. See The Paycheck Fairness Act, HR 1619, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1619/text/ih.
42. Brinkley v. Harbour Rec. Club, 180 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Maron v.
Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State U., 508 Fed. Appx. 226 (4th Cir. 2013) (employer need only offer
credible evidence, not the best possible evidence, that the sex-neutral factor explained the pay
disparity).
43. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Looper
v. U. of Wisc. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62056 (explaining that the
employer’s reason for paying the female plaintiff less than a male comparator—her limited
salary history with the company and their reliance on the pay grade system for setting benefit
levels for employees with less than one year seniority—might not be a good business practice,
but that such considerations are irrelevant under the statute).
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reason” for doing so or whether the practice was “business-related.”
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has upheld an informal and subjective
salary retention policy allowing some higher-paid employees to retain
their pay when assigned lower pay-grade jobs, proclaiming no role for the
45
court in evaluating the reasonableness or wisdom of such a policy.
In this class of cases, the FOTS defense operates as a de facto
requirement that the employer acted with discriminatory intent, albeit,
with the burden on the employer to dispel an inference of discriminatory
intent by showing a sex-neutral reason for its action, instead of putting
the burden on the plaintiff to prove intent as an element of the plaintiff’s
proof. Without any constraint on the FOTS defense, the EPA is limited to
reaching only those pay disparities found to stem from the employer’s
intent to pay women less because of sex. The anything-goes cases
illustrate that broadly construing the FOTS defense effectively narrows
46
the statute to reach only intentionally discriminatory pay gaps.
Moving away from the anything-goes end of the spectrum, some
lower courts—even some courts in the same circuits that have articulated
the deferential approach—apply some degree of scrutiny to assess the
47
strength of the employer’s reasons for using the sex-neutral factor. This
can result in rejecting the defense, as in one Eighth Circuit case where
the court affirmed a jury decision for the plaintiff and rejected the
employer’s reliance on education and special recruitment efforts as
48
factors other than sex. The court found the employer’s reliance on
education unpersuasive since the skills needed for the job were acquired
on-site, and rejected the employer’s explanation that it needed to pay the
male comparator more in order to recruit him, explaining that external
49
salary pressures are not a valid reason for paying a comparator more.
More recently, a district court in the Eighth Circuit found for the plaintiff
in a bench trial, rejecting prior salary, salary negotiations, and the
employer’s effort to meet the salary demands of its top candidate as
insufficiently valid reasons for paying the female plaintiff less to do
50
substantially similar work.
Sometimes courts purport to look into the legitimacy of the
employer’s reasons, requiring some showing of reasonableness and
business justification, but find the employer’s reason to be sufficiently
business-related with minimal scrutiny. For example, in EEOC v. J.C.
51
Penney Co., the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s grant of summary
44. Id. at 467–68.
45. Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003).
46. See, e.g., Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
the FOTS need not be a good reason as long as it is gender-neutral and applied in good faith).
47. See discussion infra, notes 49–53.
48. Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2006).
49. Id. at 574, 579.
50. Ewald v. Royal Norwegian Embassy, 82 F. Supp. 3d 871 (D. Minn. 2014).
51. 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1989).
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for the employer based on its assertion of a head of household
requirement for spousal medical insurance coverage. The court rejected
the employer’s argument that any sex-neutral factor could support a
disparity in compensation, insisting that the factor must at least be based
52
on a legitimate business reason. The court went on, however, to accept
the head of household requirement, despite its correlation with sex, as
resting on the employer’s legitimate belief that the requirement was an
appropriate non-sex based incentive to provide the greatest level of
benefits to those employees most in need and to retain and attract
53
employees. The court did so despite the employer’s inability to prove
that it could not have accomplished these business goals by using a rule
54
with a less discriminatory effect on women.
Courts occupying this middle ground take a compromise position on
the use of prior salary history to support the FOTS defense. Rather than
flatly barring prior salary or whole-sale accepting it, these courts permit
reliance on prior salary but only if it is combined with some other sexneutral factor. Reliance on prior salary combined with the comparator’s
greater relevant experience, for example, suffices to establish the FOTS
55
defense under this approach.
In the past few years, a spate of cases have come down the pike
taking a tougher stance, placing more meaningful constraints on the
sufficiency of the employer’s business reasons in support of the factor
other than sex. While not a wholesale departure from earlier precedents
scrutinizing the legitimacy of employer reasons, these cases strike a
notably critical stance toward broad uses of the defense. In one of the
56
tougher FOTS cases, Sandor v. Safe Horizon, the court actually granted
the employee summary judgment on the EPA claim, rejecting the
employer’s attempt to justify the pay disparity based on the greater
experience of the male comparator and the employer’s immediate need to
fill the position when the plaintiff went on maternity leave. As to
experience, although the comparator did have greater experience, the
court noted that it was not in a comparable position; a difference in
experience must be a job-related qualification for the position in question,
57
the court explained. The court similarly scrutinized the employer’s
immediate need and salary-matching reasons, finding them lacking force
58
in this case.
In another tough scrutiny case, the court rejected several factors
commonly asserted under the FOTS defense, prior salary, inducement,
52. Id. at 253.
53. Id. at 253–54.
54. Id. at 253.
55. See, e.g., Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1995); Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423
F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2005); EEOC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 4:07CV0143, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11596 (D. Ohio 2009); Rexroat v. Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., No. CIV. 11-1028-PHX-PGR,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3515 (D. Ariz. 2013).
56. No. 08-CV-4636 (ILG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3346 (E.D. N.Y. 2011).
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 14.
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59

and negotiation. In Dreves v. Hudson Group Retail, the court insisted
on a bona fide business-related reason for any sex-neutral factor, and
rejected the employer’s explanation that it needed to pay more to induce
the male comparator to relocate his family and take the job; the court
found this reason to be insufficiently related to the characteristics of the
job in question. The court also rejected negotiation as a reason, finding
that a male comparator’s ability to negotiate for a higher salary lacked a
60
legitimate business justification.
Notably, this court too granted
61
summary judgment to the plaintiff.
These two cases are outliers to some degree, given how rarely courts
ever grant summary judgment to plaintiffs in employment discrimination
62
cases. But they are not alone in their rigorous review of the business
justifications for a sex-neutral factor to explain a gender wage gap. Other
courts have applied a similarly tough substantive standard, requiring a
bona fide, job-related business justification, to support the defense.
Applying this standard, courts have rejected employers’ assertions of
many commonly used, facially gender-neutral explanations for paying
63
women less, including job reclassification systems,
subjective
64
evaluations of employee worth, and retention policies that hold current
employees at their pre-existing, higher rate of pay when they are assigned
65
to lower-paying job duties.
Some courts have also begun to take a critical look at employers’
reliance on “market” factors such as the need to pay more to attract a
male candidate, the use of prior salary to set pay, and the male
comparator’s more aggressive negotiation for higher pay. While there is a
wide range of judicial reactions to market-based arguments, some recent
decisions reflect a skepticism of market-based criteria such as these. For
66
example, in Sauceda v. University of Texas, the court rejected “salary
compression”—in which the university paid more to attract new hires
from an outside university while paying less to existing faculty
members—as a factor other than sex, equating the employer’s “supply
and demand” argument to the kind of stereotyped, sex-based assumptions
embedded in the employment market that Congress sought to correct
59. No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82636 (D. Vt. 2013).
60. Id. at 8–9.
61. Id. at 13.
62. See Nancy Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (Oct. 16, 2012)
(discussing the one-sidedness of employment discrimination litigation).
63. See, e.g., Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting genderneutral classification system where it was not based on legitimate business-related differences
in work responsibilities and qualifications for the positions at issue).
64. See Siler v. First State Bank, No. 04-1161-T-AN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46200
(D. Tenn. 2005) (employer could not rely on its subjective evaluation of greater interpersonal
skills of male comparator without objective evidence); Cole v. N. Am. Breweries, No. 1:13-CV236, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6157 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (employer’s “experience-driven” salary
model was too amorphous to serve as a factor other than sex).
65. See, e.g., Glenn v. Gen. Motors, 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988).
66. 958 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Texas 2013).
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through the EPA. The Eighth Circuit took a similarly dim view of
reliance on market value to set pay in a recent case, Drum v. Leeson
68
Electric Company, cautioning that courts must take care to ensure that
they do not permit employers to pay women lower wages simply because
the market will bear it. The Dreves court, mentioned above, in granting
summary judgment to the employee, was particularly scathing about the
employer’s reliance on the comparator’s negotiation skill to justify his
higher pay, admonishing that a pay disparity is no more justified when it
is the result of a single negotiation than when it is the result of a marketwide phenomenon in a market that differently values the work of men
69
and women.
The rigorous approach taken by these courts is not without
controversy, not least of all from courts taking the opposite view and
finding sex-neutrality alone to satisfy the defense. The Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Wernsing served up the fiercest criticism of the business
justification strand of case law. Critiquing the case law that requires a
job-related business reason for the sex-neutral factor, the court
characterized the EPA as depending on an employer’s discriminatory
70
intent to pay different wages because of sex. Since unequal pay for equal
work is an intentional wrong, the court continued, and markets are
impersonal, an employer’s reliance on the market cannot be
71
discriminatory.
Those courts that require merit-based, job-related
factors, instead of simply deferring to the employer’s assessment of
supply and demand, are heading into the forbidden territory of
72
“comparable worth,” the Seventh Circuit warned. Responding to the
counter-argument that such deference to the market locks in the gender
wage gap since women’s wages are less than men’s, the court tipped its
hand by revealing the gender ideology behind its deferential approach to
the market. Wages rise with experience, the court explained, and the
reason for the disparity between men’s and women’s wages is that
73
“women spend more years in child-rearing.” Against that default
assumption, scrutinizing the business justification behind market
explanations stood out as an unjustified intrusion into employer
prerogatives, taking the claim away from its disparate treatment roots
74
and into the forbidden land of disparate impact.

67. Id. at 778–80.
68. 565 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2009).
69. No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 27. But see, e.g., Underwood v. Sears &
Roebuck & Co., 343 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Del. 2004) (accepting male comparator’s negotiation
for a higher salary as a factor other than sex); Weber v. Infinity Broad. Corp., No. 02-74602,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40724 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (same); Schultz v. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 752
F. Supp. 2d 1015 (W. Dist. Wis. 2010) (same).
70. Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 470.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The turn in some of the more recent court decisions toward careful
examination of the business justifications behind an employer’s reason
for paying different wages finds support in an unexpected place. The
Supreme Court’s recent pregnancy discrimination decision makes a
75
similar move. Understanding the theory behind that decision can help
support the parallel move to tighten up the FOTS defense and respond to
criticism that doing so would transform the pay claim from a disparate
treatment claim for intentional discrimination to a disparate impact
claim.
II. LESSONS FROM YOUNG V. UPS: UNJUSTIFIED IMPACT AS
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. United Parcel
76
Services, Inc. was the first major pregnancy discrimination case to reach
77
the Court in nearly a quarter century. Peggy Young sued her employer,
UPS, after it denied her request for light-duty work in response to a lifting
78
restriction from her doctor during her first trimester of pregnancy.
Under its formal policies and past practices, UPS liberally granted such
requests—except for workers whose need for light-duty accommodation
79
stemmed from a pregnancy. The record showed that if Peggy Young had
been injured at work, lost her driver’s license (she was an air driver for
UPS), or had a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, UPS would have granted her request for a light-duty assignment for
80
the duration of her lifting restriction. Instead, UPS forced Young to take
an unpaid leave from work and she lost her health insurance—a result
that appeared particularly harsh given that her job actually required
little to no lifting in excess of the medical restriction and her coworkers
81
had offered to help her with whatever heavy lifting was required.
The Court took the case to clear up the confusion in the lower courts
over how to apply the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) when an
employer favors some, but not all, workers with a similar work capacity
82
over a pregnant employee. The issue required the Court to interpret
clause two of the PDA, which states: “. . . women affected by pregnancy,
75. See generally Young, 135 S.Ct. 1338.
76. 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015).
77. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (rejecting the
BFOQ defense to the company’s exclusion of pregnant women from jobs with high lead
exposure risks). In the interim, the Court issued a narrow ruling under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, finding a challenge to the continuing effects of pre-Act discrimination to
be time-barred. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009).
78. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1344.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1348 (citing “lower court uncertainty” about how to apply the Act in this
setting).
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childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
83
ability or inability to work. . . .” The Court found this language
ambiguous. Does it “mean that courts must compare workers only in
respect to the work limitations that they suffer” and “ignore all other
similarities or differences between pregnant and nonpregnant
84
workers?” “Or does it mean that courts, when deciding who the relevant
‘other persons’ are, may consider other similarities and differences as
85
well” and “[i]f so, which ones?”
Significantly, the Court began from the premise that Peggy Young’s
challenge to UPS’s failure to accommodate her lifting restriction while
86
pregnant was a disparate treatment claim. Indeed, the Court took pains
to note that Young did not bring a disparate impact claim, explaining the
critical difference between the two categories as follows: disparate
treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent while disparate impact
focuses on “the effects of an employment practice . . . irrespective of
87
motivation or intent.”
Finding no clarity from the text of clause two as to how this disparate
treatment claim should work, the Court turned to the foundational
individual disparate treatment case of McDonnell Douglas to construct a
similar burden-shifting model for pregnancy discrimination when an
employer disfavors pregnant workers compared to some (but not all) other
employees with a similar ability or inability to work. The Court outlined
the modified McDonnell Douglas framework for this setting as follows.
First, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that she is
within the protected class (affected by pregnancy or related medical
condition) and sought an accommodation which her employer denied,
despite accommodating “others ‘similar in their ability or inability to
88
work.’” Once the plaintiff meets the prima facie case, the employer “may
then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on
‘legitimate,
nondiscriminatory’
reasons
for
denying
her
89
accommodation.” In a departure from the classic McDonnell Douglas
framework, in which any nondiscriminatory explanation meets this
burden, the Court in Young set limits on the kind of pregnancy-neutral

83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2015).
84. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1348.
85. Id. at 1349.
86. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1344.
87. Id. Young actually had sought, unsuccessfully, to amend her complaint to add a
disparate impact claim. Young v. UPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30764 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2010)
(denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and add a disparate impact claim for failure
to exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a disparate impact charge with the EEOC).
88. Id. at 1353–54.
89. Id. at 1354.
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90

explanations that suffice. The mere desire to save money and/or
maximize convenience by withholding accommodations from pregnant
workers are not, the Court cautioned, legitimate nondiscriminatory
91
reasons for refusing to accommodate pregnant workers.
If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff may then attempt to
show that the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is really a
pretext for discrimination. Here’s where things become interesting. The
Court explained this stage of the burden-shifting framework as follows:
[T]he plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing
sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a
significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently
strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along
with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional
92
discrimination.
Under this PDA pretext model, the weakness of the employer’s
business justification for treating pregnant workers worse than some
favored workers with a similar work capacity establishes that the
employer’s reason was really a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff
need not show any separate proof of discriminatory intent; she need show
only that the employer’s reason was not “strong” enough “to justify the
93
burden” on pregnant women.
Predictably, the dissenting Justices, led by Justice Scalia, accused
the Court of “bungling the dichotomy between claims of disparate
treatment and claims of disparate impact” and bemoaned “the topsyturvy world” in which “a pregnant woman can establish disparate
treatment by showing that the effects of her employer’s policy fall more
harshly on pregnant women than on others . . . and are inadequately
94
justified.” In response to the dissent’s charge of blurring the treatmentimpact boundary, the Court emphasized “the continued focus on whether
the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference
of intentional discrimination avoids confusing the disparate-treatment
95
and disparate-impact doctrines.” As a matter of law, however, under the
Young framework, the intentional discrimination that the model purports
to discern may exist even when the employer genuinely believed the
90. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (employer’s
nondiscriminatory reason need only be analytically distinct from the protected class, it need
not be “legitimate” in any substantive sense).
91. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1354. As the Court explained its rationale for this limitation,
a cost- or convenience-based justification for excluding pregnancy from the class of conditions
covered might have justified even the benefit policy at issue in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), the very case that prompted Congress to enact the PDA. Id.
92. Id. at 1354.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1355.
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factually correct, albeit (as determined by a court) insufficiently weighty
reason for disfavoring pregnant women. This marks an innovation from
the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework in which an honest belief
in a nondiscriminatory reason dispels an inference of intentional
discrimination, even if the employer’s reason was not just poor in its
96
rationale but incorrect in its factual premises.
Although not fully elaborated, the Young opinion contains the seeds
of a defense of the bridge from unjustified impact to disparate treatment.
The model the Court crafted proceeds on the theory that the burden on
pregnant women from the employer’s policies, when insufficiently
justified by a good enough business rationale, reflects the employer’s
insufficient concern for pregnant workers and their employment
opportunities. The question at the heart of the model is, as the Court
phrases it, “Why, when the employer accommodated so many, could it not
97
accommodate pregnant women as well?” Answering truthfully with a
nondiscriminatory explanation is not enough if the explanation is not
weighty enough to justify the harm.
While admittedly, it tugs at the boundary of the disparate treatment
category to infer discriminatory intent from unjustified impact, it is
hardly unprecedented. In a case decided the same term as Young, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
98
Inc., the Court similarly broadened the disparate treatment framework,
this time for religious discrimination, to encompass an employer’s facially
neutral rule that burdens members of a religious group along with
nonreligious workers. In that case, the store’s “Look Policy” prohibiting
caps and other head coverings had the effect of excluding Muslim women
who wear head scarfs for religious reasons, even as it excluded other
applicants who wear caps and other head coverings for nonreligious
reasons. Instead of requiring the EEOC to prove that the store’s policy
was adopted with the discriminatory purpose of excluding Muslim
women, or applied with a discriminatory intent to exclude Muslim
applicants, the Court upheld the suit, overturning the lower court’s grant
of summary judgment to the employer. The court found the employer had
engaged in disparate treatment because it assigned Muslim applicants to
a larger group of disfavored applicants without a sufficiently strong
99
reason for not exempting religious applicants from the general ban. The
Court resoundingly rejected the employer’s argument that this should

96. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (“The
fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants
does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether
the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination.”).
97. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1355.
98. 135 S.Ct. 2028 (2015).
99. See Michael C. Harper, Distinguishing Disparate Treatment from Disparate
Impact: Confusion on the Court, Oct. 30, 2015, SSRN (on file with author).
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have been brought as a disparate impact claim, situating it firmly within
100
a disparate treatment framework.
A greater stretch of the disparate treatment boundary occurred in
101
the politically charged case of Ricci v. DeStefano,
a Title VII action
brought by a group of mostly white firefighters (excepting the one Latino
named plaintiff) challenging the city of New Haven’s decision to discard
the results of a standardized test for promotion that would have had a
disparate impact against minority firefighters. The Court found that the
plaintiffs succeeded in establishing that the city engaged in race-based
disparate treatment when it decided not to make promotions based on the
test results without a sufficient basis in evidence for believing that using
the test would subject it to disparate impact liability. The key to
understanding how the decision expands disparate treatment doctrine is
that the city’s action was neutral on its face—it discarded the test results
for everyone and made no promotions—and the plaintiffs offered no proof
that the City acted with a deliberate discriminatory intent to harm white
firefighters because of their race. Although the city clearly knew that
discarding the test results would mean that the firefighters who
performed well, a group that was disproportionately white, would not be
promoted, mere knowledge of disproportionate harm is usually not
102
tantamount to a discriminatory racial intent. Instead of requiring proof
that the city acted with a deliberate intent to harm white firefighters
because they are white, the Court focused on the lack of a sufficient
justification for burdening the high-performing, mostly white, testtakers. Because the Court found that the promotion test actually was jobrelated, it concluded that the city had an insufficient basis to believe that
it would have faced disparate impact liability for making promotions
based on the test. In other words, the unjustified burden on the group of
predominantly white test-takers formed the crux of the disparate
treatment violation.
Although they lie at the margins of employment discrimination law,
these cases share space with others relying on a significant burden to the
plaintiff class, combined with the employer’s insufficient justification for
103
it, to support a claim for disparate treatment.
An applicant strength
test known to reduce female applicants’ chances for employment and
adopted with weak justification, for example, was the basis for a
judgment of disparate treatment, in addition to disparate impact, against
100. Abercrombie, 135 S.Ct. at 2033.
101. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
102. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (rejecting women’s equal
protection challenge to state’s veterans preference in public employment; even though the
state knew that the class of veterans benefited was over 98% male and would have the effect
of shutting women out of state jobs, plaintiffs must prove the state adopted the preference
“because of” and not “in spite of” the harm to women).
103. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 701, 776 n.266 (2006).
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104

the employer adopting it.
Likewise, an English-only policy with a
predictably harsh effect on Latino employees, adopted without weighty
business reasons, has supported disparate treatment liability against the
105
employer.
And harassment has always difficult to classify as purely
disparate treatment, especially when it does not target particular
individuals or when it is perpetrated by persons not acting as agents of
106
the employer.
Nevertheless, it is well-settled that harassment is a
107
species of disparate treatment.
All that is to say, there is more porosity along the treatment/impact
border than the Court and many commentators often acknowledge. In the
Young PDA framework, the unjustified burden on pregnant women from
the employer’s accommodation of other conditions with a similar effect on
work establishes a disparate treatment claim. This path to disparate
treatment has implications for the recent efforts, both judicial and
legislative, to more carefully evaluate the strength of the business
reasons behind an employer’s asserted sex-neutral factor in equal pay
claims. Contrary to critics’ charges, tightening the FOTS defense to
incorporate a more rigorous scrutiny of purportedly sex-neutral
justifications would not represent an unprecedented merger of disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims.
That this move finds support in the case law, however, does not
necessarily make it normatively defensible. For that, we need to consider
what purpose it serves to infer discriminatory intent from insufficiently
justified harm to the protected class. Here too, the Young case contains
helpful insights. The model the Court adopted is well-suited to capturing
the kind of bias and devaluation of pregnant workers that leads
employers to deny pregnant employees the same accommodations that
are broadly granted to others. Requiring additional proof of an intent to
discriminate against pregnancy would leave the Act unable to reach the
kinds of biased implicit judgments about pregnant workers that underlie
selective accommodation policies like the one at issue in Young.
104. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006)
(discussing weak justification for employee strength test with a marked disparate impact on
women supported disparate treatment verdict for the EEOC).
105. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting insufficient
business justification for strict English-only policy supported employees’ disparate treatment
claim).
106. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357
(2009) (explaining the difficulty of situating sexual harassment within classic disparate
treatment theory).
107. See, e.g., Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1044–45 (1993) (explaining that the 1991
Act’s addition of a damages remedy for “intentional discrimination,” as opposed to disparate
impact, means that sexual harassment claimants will now be able to seek damages under the
statute); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (treating sexual harassment
as intentional discrimination for purposes of the 1991 Civil Rights Act). But cf. Camille Hebert,
The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341
(2004–05) (arguing for a disparate impact approach to sexual harassment).
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The refusal to accommodate pregnant workers, even while granting
accommodations to many other employees, is likely not the product of a
108
deliberate, conscious animus against pregnant workers.
It more likely
reflects the employer’s relative lack of concern for pregnant workers and
the lesser value the employer places on retaining them in the
109
workplace.
Research on the maternal wall has documented “an
underlying schema that assumes a lack of competence and commitment
when women are viewed through the lens of motherhood and
110
housework.”
The implicit assumption that pregnancy marks a
detachment from the labor force and prioritization of family over work
shapes employer evaluations about how much to invest in retaining of
pregnant workers. Viewing workers through the lens of prospective
motherhood, employers overestimate the disruption that would result
from accommodating pregnant workers and under-estimate the business
111
value of retaining them.
In the Young case itself, for example, the
employer held fast to its refusal to accommodate pregnancy despite the
fact that Peggy Young’s coworkers volunteered to help her with any lifting
that exceeded the medical restriction, so that any disruption would have
112
been negligible or nonexistent. Whether consciously or not, stereotyped
judgments about the worth of pregnant workers shape employers’
113
decisions about whether and how much to invest in them as employees.
108. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 102–03 (2013) (discussing the
complexity of cultural reactions to mothers, which include a reverence for pregnancy and
idealized motherhood and an ambivalence about working mothers).
109. Cf. Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance
Appraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649 (1993) (reporting results of study finding male reviewers
engaged in stereotyping against pregnant workers, resulting in significantly more negative
performance appraisals).
110. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”:
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1327 (2008).
111. For a sampling of the research documenting bias in how pregnant workers are
evaluated, see Jennifer Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on
Hiring Decisions and Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497 (2007); Bragger et al., The Effects
of the Structured Interview on Reducing Biases Against Pregnant Job Applicants, 46 SEX
ROLES 215 (2002); Caroline Gatrell, Managing the Maternal Body: A Comprehensive Review
and Transdisciplinary Analysis, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 97, 98–100 (2011); Barbara Masser
et al., ‘We Like You, But We Don’t Want You’—The Impact of Pregnancy in the Workplace, 57
SEX ROLES 703 (2007); Liisa Mäkelä, A Narrative Approach to Pregnancy-related
Discrimination and Leader-follower Relationships, 19 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 677 (2011);
Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297,
1306 (2007).
112. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
113. See Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making
of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 476–79 (2014) (explaining that employer
estimates of the cost of pregnancy leave contained biases about the expected return on
employer investments in workers and assumptions about conflicts between work and
pregnancy); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
961, 1028, 1032 (2013) (discussing the role of stereotype-driven estimates of cost and “still
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The searching review of employer justifications for less generous policies
toward pregnancy, as mandated in Young, is well-designed to reach this
114
kind of bias.
This justification for Young’s reliance on unjustified impact to infer
discriminatory intent—that it is necessary to reach the stereotyping and
implicit bias behind the different treatment of the protected class—also
supports extending this hybrid treatment-by-impact model to the equal
pay claim. The next section considers what is to be gained from tightening
up the FOTS defense to scrutinize the employer’s business reasons for
paying women less.
III. THE CASE FOR TIGHTENING THE FOTS DEFENSE:
CONTESTING MARKET NEUTRALITY AND UNCOVERING
IMPLICIT BIAS IN SETTING PAY.
At its broadest, without any inquiry into the business case for paying
a woman less, the FOTS defense threatens to turn the disparate
treatment equal pay claim into a search for a conscious discriminatory
intent to pay a woman less because of her sex. If any factor other than
sex, however slight, can justify paying a woman less to do the same work
as a man, then the FOTS defense will serve to narrow the scope of
actionable pay discrimination to include only those pay disparities that
cannot be explained by a sex-neutral motive. Requiring courts to
scrutinize the business justification behind the employer’s sex-neutral
explanation for the pay disparity—as the Paycheck Fairness Act would
mandate and as some lower courts are already doing—would make the
equal pay claim more likely to capture pay disparities reflecting implicit
bias and stereotyped judgments about employee worth, and not just the
much narrower class of pay decisions stemming from a conscious intent
to pay women less.
Rather than reflecting a deliberate decision to take sex into account
in setting pay—the theory of pay discrimination reflected in the
majority’s controversial Ledbetter ruling—unequal pay for equal work is
more likely a reflection of subconscious stereotypes about women’s worth
115
as workers.
The literature on the pay gap suggests that employers
116
assess women’s pay at lower levels without realizing they are doing so.
A more likely scenario than an employer making a deliberate decision to
take sex into account in setting pay is that employers rely on
prevalent stereotypes and bias about the capacity of pregnant employees or the likelihood that
pregnant employees return to work after childbirth” underlying employer policies that
accommodate some favored conditions while omitting pregnancy).
114. See Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
115. See Deborah L. Brake, What Counts as “Discrimination” in Ledbetter and the
Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 671 (2008) (explaining that the
Ledbetter decision proceeds from the definition of pay discrimination as a conscious intent to
pay a woman less because of her sex).
116. See Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: The High Cost of
Avoiding Negotiation—and Positive Strategies for Change 98–100, 119–20 (2007).

2016

REVIVING PAYCHECK FAIRNESS: WHY AND HOW THE
FACTOR-OTHER-THAN-SEX DEFENSE MATTERS

909

discretionary pay systems that open the door to implicit bias, resulting in
paying women less. That was the story told by the plaintiffs’ experts in
the nationwide lawsuit against Wal-Mart, where, controlling for
seniority, number of weeks worked during the year, full-time or part-time
work, job position, job review rating, and numerous other factors, women
at all levels and in all regions received less pay than men in the same
117
jobs. Lab experiments support this theory, finding that subjects set pay
at a higher rate for male candidates than for equally qualified female
118
candidates.
It is unlikely that all or most of these subjects consciously
decided to set lower wages for the women candidates.
Of course, not everyone agrees that any kind of pay discrimination,
conscious or not, lies behind the gender wage gap. Skeptics claim that the
disparity in men’s and women’s wages is due to women’s own choices and
119
the neutral market forces that respond to them.
This article is not the
place for an exhaustive review of the literature on the gender wage gap
or to rehash the debate over its sources. Suffice it to say that some
significant portion of the wage gap is not explained by the
nondiscriminatory variables that researchers have thought to account
120
for.
The lure of market justifications as an explanation for paying
women less is precisely why courts need to carefully look at the strength
of the justifications underlying employers’ appeals to the market as a
121
factor other than sex.
More careful scrutiny of what lies behind market-based explanations
as a factor other than sex can reveal the paucity of the employer’s
117. See Deborah Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest
for Equal Pay, 46 N. ENG. L. REV. 229, 234, 240–41 (2012). The gap increased over a worker’s
career; for example, among new hourly wage workers, men earned thirty-five cents more per
hour when hired, but the gap grew to $1.16/hour five years later. Id. at 241.
118. See, e.g., Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the Review of the
Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical Study, 41
SEX ROLES 509 (1999); Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?,
112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1316 (2007).
119. See, e.g., Gary Siniscalco et al., The Pay Gap, the Glass Ceiling, and Pay Bias:
Moving Forward 50 Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 395, 400–13
(2014).
120. See, e.g., Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory
Wage Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 404–06 (2013) (summarizing the literature and demonstrating the inability of
nondiscriminatory explanations to explain away the gender wage gap); Fifty Years After the
Equal Pay Act: Assessing the Past, Taking Stock of the Future, NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE
(June
2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/image_file/equal_paytask_force_progress_report_june_10_2013.pdf; Christianne Corbett & Catherine Hill,
Graduating to a Pay Gap; The Earnings of Women and Men One Year after College Graduation,
AAUW (2012), http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/graduating-to-a-pay-gap-the-earnings-ofwomen-and-men-one-year-after-college-graduation.pdf (finding a 7% unexplained pay gap
after accounting for factors such as occupational choice and hours worked).
121. See MCCANN, supra note 13, at 40–41 (discussing the ease with which employers
defend pay discrimination claims by invoking “a ‘free market’ defense at every turn” and how
that argument resonates with judges’ assumptions that “discrimination is the rare exception
rather than the norm”).
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justification for relying on “the market” to set pay. Employer suppositions
about the market are often based on nothing more than stereotyped
122
assumptions about employee worth.
Allusions to the market mask
embedded preconceptions about marketability that place a higher value
123
on male workers.
While market-based explanations such as prior
salary, negotiating for pay, or market worth may sound gender-neutral,
124
they often incorporate implicitly biased evaluations of employee worth.
Unless courts scrutinize the business justifications behind assertions of
market value, they risk turning the FOTS defense into an open door to
125
implicit bias in setting pay.
Even if the anything-goes approach to the FOTS defense were
replaced with a job-relatedness and business necessity standard,
however, the problem would remain that many courts will never reach
the defense because of the strict approach to the similarity required to
make out a prima facie case of unequal pay for substantially equal work.
Doctrinally, increasing judicial scrutiny of the strength of the employer’s
reason will not help clear this hurdle. And yet, shifting the equal pay
claim away from a search for deliberate discriminatory intent may,
indirectly, lead courts to view this threshold issue differently. The current
strictness in comparator proof stems from courts’ conception of disparate
126
treatment as requiring a conscious discriminatory intent.
Only by
eliminating all nontrivial differences between the comparators can courts
assure themselves that the reason for disfavoring the plaintiff was more
likely than not the employer’s discriminatory intent instead of some
127
benign difference in circumstances.
In other words, a narrow view of
disparate treatment as requiring proof of a conscious discriminatory
122. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001); see
also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 990 (2011) (“In the absence of a professional
compensation survey, analyzed by a professional compensation consultant, ‘market wages’ are
simply an employer’s hunch about what the position is worth.”).
123. See Porter & Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth, supra note 10, at 184
(discussing the schemas that lead employers to undervalue the market worth of their female
employees, and cause women worker to undervalue their own worth). See also Paula A.
Monopoli, The Market Myth and Pay Disparity in Legal Academia, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 867 (2016)
(discussing how gender bias underlies market justifications for paying women law faculty less
compared to their male peers).
124. See MCCANN, supra note 13, at 241 (detailing how wage-setting practices are
often insulated from market pressures of supply and demand and that market justifications
often lack empirical support).
125. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 10, at 162–63 (exposing the gender bias in
the most common “market excuses” employers use to justify a pay disparity: reliance on prior
salary, matching of an outside offer, and differences in employees’ willingness to negotiate
pay).
126. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,
778–79 (2011).
127. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 223 (2009) (“The ultimate basis for the elaborate legal rules
the courts have developed must be the belief that random fluctuations are more likely than
discrimination in the American workplace, and thus any differences are more likely
attributable to a host of rational and irrational factors than they are to an intent to
discriminate.”).
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intent is what lies behind the requirement of strict proximity between
comparators. If that understanding were to shift, so that disparate
treatment also encompasses implicit bias in setting pay, the reason for
insisting on strict similarity between comparators would weaken. Of
course, doctrinally, it is a long way from toughening up the FOTS defense
to easing up on the similarity of comparators in the prima facie case. But
it is not so far-fetched to think that changing the theory of discrimination
embodied in the FOTS defense would have an influence on how courts
conceive of discrimination at the prima facie case stage too. Substantially
similar work would still be the touchstone for the equal pay claim, but
perhaps courts will view that inquiry less rigidly if their understanding
of what pay discrimination is broadens to encompass implicit bias.
Even if reshaping the FOTS doctrine does not significantly change
the outcome of many cases in litigation, it could still have an important
effect on the political and institutional struggles for pay equality. Michael
McCann’s important book, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the
Politics of Legal Mobilization, documents a dynamic relationship between
formal legal rights, political mobilization and institutional change. Even
when strengthening legal rights, as with the early Supreme Court cases
interpreting the equal pay laws, did little to change losing outcomes in
litigation, it still inspired collective action and provided resources on
which equal pay advocates could draw in making demands on
128
employers. Strengthening formal legal rights raises expectations about
what is possible and mobilizes activists and advocates working for equal
pay. Even when lawsuits lose, activists may succeed in pressing for
institutional change, using the language of legal rights as a resource to
129
rally supporters and get the attention of employers.
In McCann’s
terms, strengthening the doctrine of the equal pay claim enhanced the
130
symbolic capital of legal rights.
The fashioning of doctrinal rules for
equal pay claims is important not just for its effect on litigation, but also
131
for its influence on the social movement and politics of equal pay.
Strengthening the FOTS defense as advocated here would invite
critical scrutiny of the market rationalizations that go to the heart of the
political and legal battle over equal pay. Enabling the doctrine to expose
the weaknesses behind these rationales would reveal the implicit gender
bias in discretionary pay systems that results in paying women less for
substantially equal work. At the heart of the debate over the proper scope
128. MCCANN, supra note 13, passim (situating rights-claiming as a social practice
that enables advocates and activists to draw on legal resources in a political dialogue with
legislatures and employers).
129. Id. at 138 (arguing that law can be a “club” for employees and a resource for social
movements even without victory in court, and recognizing “the discursive power of rights
discourse”).
130. Id. passim (discussing the symbolic capital of legal rights-framing).
131. Id. at 88–91, 137 (articulating a dynamic relationship between law and social
change in which law facilitates collective action by citizens).
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of the FOTS defense is a contest over the legitimacy of market
explanations for paying women less. By engaging in this debate, the
FOTS reform strategy could have a feedback effect on litigation outcomes
132
by strengthening the social norms in support of pay equality.
As was
true for the Ledbetter ruling and the legislative response to it, more is at
stake in the scope of the FOTS defense than a narrow doctrinal change.
The issue at the heart of the controversy is the legitimacy of the gender
wage gap.

132. See Goldberg, supra note 126, at 795 (arguing that the likelihood of judges finding
discrimination in employment discrimination cases increases when social norms support
widely held beliefs in the prevalence and wrongfulness of discrimination).

